Abstract
INTRODUCTION
It is well established that there is free movement of workers, goods, capital and services in a At present, there is a growing number of harmonised EU private international law mechanisms which form part of the Member States' legal orders. In particular, EU private international law rules are relied upon by the EU policy-makers to allocate jurisdiction between the Member States' courts and identify the applicable laws to the merits of civil and commercial law disputes (including family law disputes) with an international element.
Council Regulation 1215/2012 ('Brussels I recast') is to be used by national courts when assuming jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters as well as when another Member
State's court judgment is sought to be registered and enforced. Council Moreover, different sets of private international law instruments do achieve a level of harmonisation with regard to such procedural aspects as, for example, avoidance of parallel 6 The Brussels I recast [2012] which are being drafted and applied in a diverse Union. A major concern in the EU is that many of the legislative instruments may be a result of a compromise achieved at EU level. It has been submitted by Kerber1 9F 18 that:
"collective decision-making implies large costs such as knowledge, rent-seeking problems, inefficiencies, or inflexibility, it might be that considerable costs through market failure must also be accepted before it is advisable to turn to centralization or mobility barriers."2 0F
19
One might question the effectiveness of legislative instruments which may be affected by a level of political pressure from Member States as well as from the EU policy-makers. 41 Fentiman has submitted that " […] there remains a nagging doubt that no legal rule can be uniformly applied in another court because a judge applying foreign law will always lack the necessary 'internal attitude.'"4 3F
42
The practical hurdles in this context appeared to shape the litigants' strategies in Sheraleen Moreover, a particular theoretical challenge in the European Union context with the concept of "conflicts justice", as defined above, is that it ignores the concept of "procedural conflicts justice"4 6 F 45 which, in the light of Brussels Ia and IIa, is central to the administration of justice in the EU. The success of the Brussels regime in the EU strongly suggests that a different definition of justice in the EU may be needed. The deduction could be strengthened by putting forward that the level of harmonisation, which has already been achieved for some procedural aspects relevant to cross-border private disputes in the EU, is a truly unique feature which characterises the EU civil justice system. The point is captured well by Garnett4 7 F 46 who noted that:
"In the area of procedural law, given the strong connections between procedure and the social, political, and economic mores of a country and the consequent greater differences in procedural laws between countries,4 8 F 47 harmonization has proved difficult with only a few, limited regional examples such as the EU Council Regulation on Jurisdiction and Judgments"4 9F
48
The Brussels I Recast Regulation (which is the most recently adopted PIL instrument) went further, aiming to guarantee the litigants' right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial in cross-border cases. "16 […] some practices in the common law states are unknown in most civil law states. Rules of evidence also differ widely. Practices specific to common law states include an obligation on litigants to disclose documents which adversely affect their own case or support another party's case (CPR r 31.6(b)), the preparation and exchange of witness statements for use at trial (CPR r 32.4), and the cross-examination of witnesses, both witnesses of fact and expert witnesses. 17 The adversarial procedures in common law states are designed to assist the court to arrive at the truth. But they require more work to be done by litigants and their lawyers (often with correspondingly less work to be done by the judge) than is required under most civil law inquisitorial systems. The result is that the direct costs of litigation which have to be borne by the parties are much higher in the common law states. This is so, even when the comparison is between a civil law and a common law state where rates of remuneration charged by lawyers are at comparable levels. On the other hand, in the common law states fewer judges are required, and fewer cases are actually tried, instead of being settled. These facts may help to keep down the cost to the common law states of providing for the administration of justice.
Having regard to the differences of procedure, it is not surprising that outcomes are different, even in those cases where there is no significant difference between the provisions of the substantive laws of the states in question."5 4 F
53
In theory, there is a strong case that the EU legislative developments do indicate that the EU concept of justice in cross-border private cases would need to be broadened, in order to cover certain procedural aspects which are dealt with in the EU PIL instruments. Indeed, the triangular relationship between the relevant set of procedural laws, the governing substantive laws and the available remedy may well be among the primary considerations which are affecting the parties' litigation tactics and settlement dynamics in cross-border cases. In other words, the need for the parties to obtain an effective remedy in such cases may be determinative for the parties' decision where to sue as well as for parties' strategies regarding governing law. There are a number of examples which illustrate that this triangular relationship has a significant impact on the litigants' strategies and any settlement dynamics in the EU. Therefore an improvement in the account given to foreign law agreed to by the parties in the family law area will require legislative changes in the UK. identification of applicable law, on the one hand, and the available remedy, on the other hand.
With this in mind, a definition of the concept of justice in the EU presupposes finding a response to the following question: What is "the impact of social facts on the development, operation and effect of legal rules"6 9F 68 which form part of the harmonised EU PIL instruments?
In his analysis of the sociological dimensions of private international law, Zweigert has noted:
"If you go through the classical principles of conflict of laws, you will detect very few rules where the impact of social facts, some substantive points of view, are involved. The strongest substantive point of view is to be found in the institution of public policy. This is, however, a purely negative point of view which denies the whole play of conflict rules in exceptional cases; where an applicable rule is not applied because it offends too strongly indispensable values of the lex fori."7 0F
69
That said, an entirely different set of objectives characterises the current EU civil justice framework. As already noted, the right to an effective remedy appears to be at the heart of the EU Justice Agenda 2020 and the newly adopted Brussels I Recast Regulation which puts them in line with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.
Moreover, the Brussels I Recast Regulation, for the first time, sets out "the aim of making cross-border litigation less time-consuming and costly". 88 It has been also argued that if there is no "certain affinity between the legal systems amongst which unification is to be achieved […], the provisions of the uniform laws run the risk of being substantially altered when they are adapted to the various internal legal courts becoming more attractive than others. This would be so because the jurisdictions, attracting more cross-border cases, will become dominant, being a venue of choice for the high value cross-border disputes which would often involve highly sophisticated parties. This is something which is already happening in cross-border EU competition law cases where the majority of claims are being brought in England and Wales, the Netherlands and Germany.1 08 F
107
A competition among the different judicial regimes could be driven by large law firms (and increasingly by litigation funders1 0 9F 108 , perhaps) which may be seen as the catalyst for the change in the EU model of administration of justice. As a result, the judges in some EU Member States more often have to decide cases with an international element, gaining more experience than the judges in the other Member States in dealing with cross-border disputes.
These developments may better explain why some judicial systems may become more attractive for litigants than others. For example, remedies could be obtainable more quickly in jurisdictions where settlements could be easily achieved after jurisdiction had been established there. Indeed, an OECD report1 10 F 109 and the 2015 EU Justice Scoreboard1 11 F 110 both re-affirm that there is a level of variation in the performance of the various judicial systems across the European Union. In particular, the trial length and appeal rates do vary; the models of court governance and the relevant budgets are different.1 12 F 111 Therefore, the length of the court proceedings may be an important factor to be taken into account when considering as to how justice should be administered in cross-border cases arising in the EU. In England,
Zuckerman has noted:
"It is not enough to ask whether the system produces correct judgments. We have also to ask how timely judgments are, because a judgment given too late may amount to denial of justice even though it involves correct application of the law to true facts. Cost too is relevant to the assessment of procedural systems. The resources available to the system will influence its global level of rectitude of decision. Cost will influence its global level of rectitude of decision. Cost will affect access to justice and, lastly, high litigation costs may enable rich litigants to acquire a procedural advantage against their opponents. Each of these aspects is clearly relevant to the assessment of any system of civil justice."1 13 F
112
In other words, Zuckerman's observations strongly suggest that issues of "delay" and "costs" are two important factors which any system for effective administration of justice would need to consider. It should be noted that a comparative study,1 14 F 113 which was conducted by a research consortium, has addressed "how different jurisdictions approach the two linked subjects of litigation funding and costs."1 15F 114 Thus, the EU Member States could well have legitimate incentives to make their national systems functioning effectively, which would allow their law firms to attract litigants from other EU Member States, exporting cross-border legal services.
How do the cross-border complexities/implications of claims affect the litigants' strategies of the parties and the settlement dynamics in the EU? Hartley1 16 F 115 has recently noted that:
"the outcome of a case depends much more on jurisdiction than choice of law. This has become clearly apparent, at least in leading centres of litigation, in recent times. It explains why the parties will fight tooth and nail on jurisdictional issues; then, once these are decided, settle the case without further litigation. This in turn accounts for the fact that in England today there are far more reported cases on international jurisdiction and procedure than on choice of law."1 1 7F
116
The quoted view is indeed interesting, but not fully substantiated, indicating that further empirical evidence is needed in the EU context. On the one hand, the empirical evidence from the U.S. clearly demonstrates that "forum does affect outcome". 
METHODOLOGICAL CHALLENGES: MEASURING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE EU CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM
In the light of the objectives of the EU civil justice system, the first methodological challenge
was to specify what empirical evidence is necessary to test the effects of the harmonised PIL instruments on the litigation strategies of those who need a remedy in cross-border cases.1 2 5F
124
It has been submitted that:
"Although there are many ways in which outputs and outcomes assessment can be conducted, these methodological options are not all equivalent: some produce more credible estimates of policy effects than others. Therefore, it will be necessary to do a qualitative research project, turning to the views of legal practitioners. In this context, the researchers will need to test the effect of the harmonised PIL instruments by discussing with legal practitioners key questions concerning cross-border litigation. Accordingly, as a part of the project, the researchers will be undertaking qualitative interviews1 38 F 137 with legal practitioners. Legal practitioners are well placed to provide us with information about litigation strategies.1 39F 138 The legal practitioners would have some useful insights as to how the current EU Civil Justice framework is shaping the litigants' strategies. In particular, some important issues which may need to be explored, as part of the qualitative interviews with legal practitioners, relate to the remedies sought, the level of legal uncertainty and the settlement dynamics in the cross-border context. Bearing in mind the EU legal landscape, it would be useful to identify the factors which affect the litigants' strategies and settlement dynamics in cross-border cases, making a difference between settlement as a tactical device in cases where an action has been initiated, on the one hand, and settlement as a dispute resolution mechanism which is used before an action has been started, on the other hand. Research studies,1 40F 139 undertaken in a domestic context, do suggest that "claimants significantly discount their claims in reaching mediated settlements.
There is a price to pay in terms of substantive justice for early settlement."1 41 F 140 This might be even more of an issue in cross-border cases where the lengthy jurisdictional challenges would inflate the cost of litigation which taken together with the level of uncertainty generated by the current institutional framework might force significantly discounted settlements.
Therefore, an appropriately conducted study would pre-suppose the collection of empirical evidence which will help to explain the litigation pattern in Europe. There is a need for such an empirical study to be conducted in several Member States, with different legal traditions/heritages, with a view to assessing the effectiveness of the current PIL institutional framework. This would allow the researchers to measure how the current PIL framework is affecting the litigants' strategies in different jurisdictions.1 42F 141 That said, a main challenge in doing a comparative qualitative research project in law is recruiting interview participants from a number of jurisdictions, representing different legal systems.
Central to the process of conducting qualitative interviews with legal practitioners is drawing a sampling framework1 43 F 142 which is to be used when selecting interview participants.
In this context, it should be noted that drawing a sampling framework in various jurisdictions should factor in the national characteristics. In addition, the researchers are conducting The non-schedule standardised (or unstructured schedule)1 45F 144 type of interview is being employed for the purposes of this research project. This allows researchers to take into account the specific experience and the viewpoint of each respondent. A structure to the interviews is created, but the interviewer and/or interviewee is always free to depart from the structure if the participants' viewpoints and experience were thereby better expressed. The interview questions focus on key areas: 1) General questions about cross-border disputes; 2)
Due to the large data (quantitative and qualitative), the way the data is organised will be central to an effective and comparative data analyses. In this context, Bazeley has submitted:
"Often, in funding proposals, there will be a lengthy description of how qualitative data are going to be gathered, but the only thing said about how these data are going to be managed or analysed is that 'themes will be identified in the data'. Similarly, writers of journal articles often simply identify and discuss four or five 'themes' as their analysis of the qualitative data in the study, with no attempt to link these themes into a more 147 Empirical evidence will be needed, in order to fully explain how the EU civil justice framework, based on harmonised PIL instruments, is functioning at present. Therefore, the authors make a case that empirical evidence is necessary to test the effects of the harmonised PIL instruments on those who need a remedy in cross-border cases.
The diverse legal landscape in the EU, including the various national traditions/regimes, means that the jurisdictional divergences may make a difference for litigants, seeking to obtain an effective remedy. In the EU context, there is a triangular relationship between allocation of jurisdiction before an appropriate Member State court and identification of applicable law, on the one hand, and substantive outcomes in a cross-border dispute, on the other hand. Furthermore the recognition and enforcement of that substantive judgment is a fifth freedom in EU law (free movement of "judgments") but like the original four freedoms is often not legally absolute and even where it purports to be absolute (eg in Brussels IIa in relation to access rights and the overriding of a non-return order in child abduction cases) in terms of recognition and enforceability may not in fact be actually enforceable in every EU Member State where it needs to be enforced. Hence, qualitative data is required in order to identify the important issues which appear to be affecting and shaping the litigants' strategies, settlement dynamics and enforcement efforts under the current PIL regime. Once these issues have been identified, then it will be possible to address head on the question whether the current PIL framework is effectively pursuing its objectives in crossborder cases. If justice is not administered effectively in cross-border cases, then the empirical data might suggest which issues may need to be addressed by the EU legislator and/or national legislators.
